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Abstract 
 
Intelligent tutoring systems differ from ordinary educational software in that they contain 
explicit representations of both the target subject matter and the student's knowledge, and 
that pedagogical decisions about which feedback to give, which practice problem to 
propose, etc. are based, in part, upon those knowledge representations. We argue that a 
suitable representation should satisfy two criteria that we call fidelity and efficiency. 
These criteria are developed with respect to constraints, a particular representation 
designed to satisfy both. A comparison between constraints and production rules with 
respect to these two criteria highlights the advantages of the constraint-based approach 
over the rule-based, model-tracing approach. 
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Fidelity and Efficiency of Knowledge Representations for Intelligent Tutoring Systems 
 
Stellan Ohlsson and Antonija Mitrovic 
 
 
Tutoring technology, in combination with world-wide network technology, has the 
potential to provide quality instruction for learners everywhere. Progress has been 
uneven. While network technology has surged ahead to become an everyday presence, 
tutoring technology has moved only a short distance beyond its beginnings 30 years ago 
(Sleeman & Brown, 1982). The key difference between intelligent tutoring systems 
(ITSs) and ordinary educational software is that ITSs operate on the basis of explicit 
representations of the target subject matter knowledge and of the student's knowledge. 
The central principle that underpins intelligent tutoring research is that such 
representations provide a basis for better pedagogical decisions and potentially for 
instruction that can match the effectiveness of human one-on-one tutoring. 
The choice of knowledge representation is therefore a central issue for intelligent 
tutoring (in addition to interface design, curriculum development and pedagogy, issues 
shared with other instructional technologies). On the basis of what should such a choice 
be made? As elsewhere in the field of artificial intelligence (AI), different knowledge 
representations exhibit different profiles of advantages and disadvantages. The field of 
ITS research might benefit from a systematic way of assessing knowledge 
representations. 
We discuss two dimensions along which knowledge representations might differ 
and which we claim are of central importance in ITS research. The dimensions reflect the 
double nature of an ITS as a cognitive and a computational artifact. The first dimension, 
or clusters of dimensions, is cognitive fidelity: To what extent, and in which aspects, does 
a particular knowledge representation mirror the cognition of learners and teachers? That 
is, to what extent does the ITS model human cognition in general and learning in 
particular? What are the advantages of such fidelity in an ITS? What are the 
consequences of lack of such fidelity? 
The second dimension, or cluster of dimensions, is efficiency. An ITS is a 
complicated artifact and if we are to provide the world with ITSs for every conceivable 
instructional topic, we need to adopt a tutoring technology that facilitates rapid 
implementation, evaluation and deployment (implementation efficiency). In addition, an 
implemented ITS lives in the real world, with real students banging on real key boards in 
real time. ITS technology had better be fast and robust before being let loose on the 
networks (computational efficiency). 
The choice of knowledge representation can affect any of these dimensions. In the 
following, we first introduce the constraint-based approach to knowledge representation. 
In the main section, we explore the two dimensions of fidelity and efficiency in the 
context of the constraint representation. We compare this representation to production 
systems as they are used in model-tracing systems, a prominent alternative, using our 
dimensions to guide the comparison. At the end, we offer some general conclusions. 
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CONSTRAINT-BASED MODELING 
 
Cognitive scientists draw upon several standard knowledge representation formalisms to 
explain and model cognitive phenomena: Feature vectors, propositions, semantic 
networks, schemas, production rules, Horn clauses, STRIPS operators, goal trees, goal 
stacks and so on (Markman, 1999). Each of these representations captures some feature 
or features of knowledge well while capturing others only partially or not at all. For 
example, semantic networks capture the interrelatedness of all conceptual knowledge but 
fail to capture local structure; schemas exhibit exactly the opposite profile. Production 
rules capture the situated character of practical knowledge, while goal-trees capture the 
hierarchical organization of action. Rule-based representations consist of a declarative 
(propositional) knowledge base, a rule set and an interpreter that executes the rules vis-à-
vis the knowledge base. This approach provides flexibility in execution and is thus 
particularly suitable for domains in which the ordering of problem solving steps can vary. 
No representation captures all aspects of knowledge and the set is eclectic. There is no 
principled reason to focus on precisely these knowledge representations. They are merely 
the ones cognitive scientists have thought of so far and know how to implement in 
computer programs. Inventing novel knowledge representations is one way for the 
cognitive sciences to advance. 
In prior work, we have developed a representation for declarative knowledge with 
rather different properties than the standard, propositional representations. We refer to the 
unit of knowledge in this representation as a constraint (Ohlsson & Rees, 1991a, 1991b), 
although this term means something slightly different in our usage than it does in the 
context of standard constraint-satisfaction models (Freuder & Mackworth, 1994; Lehler 
1988; Miguel, 2004). Constraints were invented to support different cognitive operations 
than those supported by propositions. The latter were originally developed by logicians to 
support inference, explanation and prediction. Constraints, in contrast, support evaluation 
and judgment. The latter processes are central for both performance and learning, because 
the learner needs to evaluate his or her progress, judge the outcomes of his or her actions 
and decide whether such-and-such a state of affairs is satisfactory and so on. 
A constraint C is a binary pair, C = <R, S>, in which R is the relevance criterion 
and S is the satisfaction criterion. R specifies the circumstances (set of situations) in 
which the constraint is relevant, while S specifies the circumstances (set of situations) in 
which the constraint is satisfied.  
The semantics of a constraint is that if R is satisfied in the current situation, then S 
ought to be satisfied also (or else something has gone wrong). A constraint is thus an 
atom of evaluative knowledge. It enables a judgment to be made as to whether the state 
of affairs that the agent has reached is acceptable or whether it should be regarded as 
unacceptable. A common mistake is to regard S as an inference to be made when R is the 
case; this is not the intent. A relevance criterion is not grounds for believing or 
concluding that the associated satisfaction criterion is true. The constraint encodes the 
norm that if R is the case, the S ought to be the case as well, not a conditional assertion 
that S is in fact the case. 
If R is the case, the conclusion that follows upon the execution of the constraint 
depends on the status of S.  If S is satisfied, then the conclusion is that the situation at 
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hand satisfies C. If S is not satisfied, the conclusion is that the situation at hand does not 
satisfy C. We refer to this as a constraint violation. If the relevance criterion is not 
satisfied, then the constraint is irrelevant and no conclusion follows, regardless of the 
status of S. 
In everyday discourse, evaluative knowledge is often expressed in what seems to 
be declarative sentences that correspond to propositions. Traffic regulations provide 
examples. Consider the sentence, "The speed limit in X-town is 50 kilometers an hour." 
A verification that this is, in fact, the current speed limit does not warrant the inference 
that any one driver is keeping his or her speed below this limit. The impact of the 
regulation is rather that the driver ought to keep his or her speed below that limit. The 
constraint representation makes this explicit: If you are driving in X-town, your speed 
should be equal to or less than 50 km/h. The relevance criterion is a conjunction of two 
simple propositions, that the person is driving and that he is in X-town. If he is riding a 
bicycle, speed limits for cars are irrelevant, and if he is not in X-town, then X-town 
traffic rules are also irrelevant. But when both conditions match the situation at hand, a 
speed greater than 50 km/h violates this regulation. In general, the constraint 
representation captures the intent behind norms. 
Constraints vary along several dimensions. (a) The criteria R and S can be simple, 
consisting of elementary propositions, or complex, consisting of conjunctions of 
propositions. In principle, the conjunctions can be arbitrarily complex, but in practice, 
this is neither desirable nor needed. (b) In state constraints, the criteria only test for 
features of the current state of affairs, while in path constraints, they also test for features 
of the path -- the sequence of actions and outcomes -- by which the agent arrived at that 
state of affairs. (c) Syntactic constraints relate features of a state or a path to each other, 
while semantic constraints relate features of a state or path to some other entity, e.g., a 
solved example or some other authoritative source of information. In the context of filling 
out tax return forms, if the sum in box n on page x is E, then the dollar amount in box m 
on page y should also be E is a syntactic constraint; if you deducted a work-related 
expense E last year, you cannot also deduct it this year is a path constraint, and the 
taxable income should be equal to what your employer reported it to be is a semantic 
constraint. 
A constraint base is any set of constraints. In the simplest case, this is an 
unordered set, without any higher-level structure. For some applications, it might be 
advantageous to impose a structure on the constraint base. It is useful to keep in mind that 
in the early days of production systems, several methods for structuring sets of 
production rules were proposed, but none of them became standard. It turned out that any 
advantage bought with such a technique could also be had by incorporating the relevant 
elements into the condition sides of the productions. Structured rule bases posed the 
problem of choosing which group of rules to execute at each moment in time. It may be 
that the same conclusion will ultimately emerge as the correct one with respect to 
constraint bases. At the present time, there is insufficient experience on which to base a 
firm opinion on this issue. 
For most applications, it makes sense to associate a constraint base with a task or 
a particular environment. For example, the set of traffic laws for X-town is a constraint 
base for the task of moving about in that particular environment. Other more or less 
codified constraint bases include the rules of good manners, the APA format for literature 
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references and Robert's Rules of Order for holding meetings. Aesthetic judgments and the 
conventions of artistic genres – e.g., the Golden Rule of proportion and the rules of 
certain types of musical compositions such as a fugue or a concerto – are also constraints 
although many of them might be held implicitly. 
A constraint base for a domain can be more or less complete. If a constraint base 
is complete, actions and sequences of actions vis-à-vis that task and their outcomes are 
correct if and only if they do not violate any of those constraints. The familiar definition 
of a linear ordering like the natural numbers is a small constraint base (more common 
formulations of the constraints in parentheses): 
 
(i) If E1 is an element, E1 is the first element, E2 is an element in the ordering, 
and E1 and E2 are distinct, then E2 cannot also be a first element. (There is 
only one first element.) 
 
(ii) If E is an element in the ordering, then E has a successor. (Every element has 
a successor.) 
 
(iii) If E1 is an element, E1 has successor E2, E3 is an element, and E2 and E3 
are distinct, then E3 cannot be a successor to E1. (The successor is unique.) 
 
If an ordering of elements violates one or more of these constraints, it is not a linear 
ordering: There are either multiple initial elements, at least one element without a 
successor or an element with more than one successor. On the other side of the coin, this 
constraint base is complete. That is, any set of elements related to each other by the 
successor relation that does not violate any of these constraints is a bone fide linear 
ordering. 
If a constraint base is incomplete, then there are solutions or performances that are 
incorrect or inappropriate in the relevant task environment, but which nevertheless do not 
violate any of the constraints. Completeness is obviously a matter of degree, and the 
consequences of a given degree of incompleteness depend on the application.  
In principle, the criteria R and S can be encoded in any way a programmer finds 
convenient, e.g., as arbitrary Lisp functions. Working constraint-based systems have in 
fact implemented them as patterns, similar to the condition side of a production rule. This 
implementation assumes that the constraints are processed via pattern matching, an 
assumption that we will adhere to throughout this paper even though it is not the only 
way to implement this type of constraint. In the context of a pattern matching system, the 
execution cycle for a constraint base is as follows: 
 
(i) Match the relevance criteria of all constraints against the current state of the 
world. 
(ii) For each constraint with a satisfied relevance criterion, match their satisfaction 
conditions against the current state of the world. 
(iii) Pass the constraint violations and satisfactions, if any, to a decision making 
module, learning mechanism or other process. 
(iv)Wait until the state of the world changes due to actions by the performance 
mechanisms or to the dynamics of the environment itself. 
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(iv) Go to i. 
 
A constraint base and an associated execution engine constitute a mechanism for 
passing judgment. A cognitive agent – human or machine – can use this mechanism to 
evaluate its own behavior. For example, a car driver can use the traffic norms to evaluate 
his or her own driving (better slow down, I'm driving too fast, again). The mechanism 
can just as easily be used to evaluate someone else's actions or their outcomes. For 
example, a police officer evaluates a person's driving by comparing it to the traffic 
regulations (you were driving to fast, again). In every day life, people are constantly 
performing both types of evaluations. On the one hand, they evaluate their own 
performance (I was unsuccessful; that went really well). On the other hand, they evaluate 
the performances of others (that speaker was not very engaging; I really liked that 
movie). Propositional representations do not support judgment and evaluative reasoning, 
because what is in fact the case has no bearing on what ought to be the case. The 
constraint representation encodes norms and other forms of evaluative knowledge 
directly. 
The issue of the proper scope of the constraint representation is intricate. One 
would expect the division between constraints and propositions to be clear-cut. Traffic 
regulations, tax laws, aesthetic impulses and mathematical constructs are all man-made, 
so it stands to reason that they consist of norms. It seems equally obvious that pieces of 
knowledge that we traditionally regard as descriptive, e.g., the laws of nature as 
formulated in the natural sciences, cannot be cast as constraints. However, closer scrutiny 
reveals complexities. For example, consider the great conservation laws of chemistry and 
physics. These include the conservation of angular momentum and the conservation of 
mass in chemical reactions. How are these used in scientific practice? One chemist has 
this to say about the conservation of mass: "There is so much trust in the mass 
conservation law that an experimental result … that does not conform is automatically 
treated as false and rejected" (Gensler, 1987, p. 78). It appears that at least some natural 
laws operate as constraints in the sense that they constitute a basis for judging and 
evaluating the outcomes of scientific procedures, an intrusion of normative, constraint-
based thinking into what we tend to regard as the stronghold of propositional knowledge 
and deductive inference. The issue arises how wide a swath of what we usually regard as 
descriptive knowledge can be reinterpreted as normative. This is an interesting question, 
but the usefulness of the constraint representation does not presuppose that all declarative 
knowledge can be represented in terms of constraints. 
 
FIDELITY AND EFFICIENCY OF CBM 
 
The Cognitive Fidelity of Constraint-Based Tutoring 
 
Research on intelligent tutoring system was from its start intertwined with the 
psychological modeling of cognitive processes. For example, the early work by J. S. 
Brown, R. Burton and K. VanLehn produced not only BUGGY (Brown &Burton, 1978), 
a cognitive model of children's subtraction errors, but also DEBUGGY (Burton, 1982), a 
diagnostic system that could interpret incorrect answers to subtraction problem in terms 
of those errors, as well as Sierra and Repair Theory (Brown & VanLehn, 1980; VanLehn 
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1990), which together provide a formal explanation of how the incorrect subtraction 
procedures arise in the first place. Similarly, the intelligent tutoring systems that use the 
so-called model-tracing technique are claimed to be based on the ACT model of the 
human cognitive architecture (Anderson, 1993; Anderson et al., 1990; Anderson et al, 
1995). Yet other types of ITS designs are claimed to be based on yet other cognitive 
theories (Doane & Sohn, 2000; Doane, Sohn & McNamara, 2000). Such connections to 
cognitive theories are often claimed as a source of strength for an approach or a particular 
system. 
This type of claim invites scrutiny. An intelligent tutoring system is supposed to 
take over (some of) the tasks of a teacher. Why is it advantageous if its knowledge 
representations and computational processes mimic those of the learner? What type of 
cognitive fidelity matters for the design of an ITS? After all, the ITS interface is likely to 
deliver instruction in the form of more or less canned text, diagrams, video clips, solved 
examples and so on. The student never sees the knowledge structures that are internal to 
the system. Why does it matter whether the latter are isomorphic to the knowledge 
structures inside the learner's head? 
For instruction to support learning, the learner's brain must be able to process and 
make use of the information contained in the instruction. Learning is a change in a 
knowledge representation, but representations cannot change in arbitrary ways. Efficient 
retrieval and application of knowledge requires a certain amount of organization, which 
in turn implies that changes are of specific types. A cognitive mechanism that computes a 
particular type of change is a learning mechanism. The statement that knowledge cannot 
change in arbitrary ways then translates into a claim that there is a limited number of 
learning mechanisms. The task of psychological research is to figure out what those 
mechanisms are; there are many proposals (association, discrimination, generalization, 
chunking, rule composition, etc.) but little by way of principles for choosing among 
them. 
One plausible principle is that learning mechanisms differ with respect to the type 
of information they take as input. After all, an improvement in a cognitive skill, a change 
in its mental representation that provides a better fit to a task environment, cannot be 
achieved out of thin air. A learning mechanism adds structure to an existing skill, and 
hence must derive that structure from some source. We refer to this as the Information 
Specificity Principle (Ohlsson, in press-a). The general schema for a learning mechanism 
is therefore as illustrated in Figure 1. 
 
 
 
Figure 1 in here 
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The implication for the design of instruction is that unless the type of information 
provided by instruction can serve as input to one or more learning mechanisms, then the 
information is inert and the instruction is likely to be ineffective. For example, suppose 
an instructor attempts to teach a concept by providing one example and one 
counterexample, in the hope that the differences will help the student sharpen his or her 
understanding of the target concept. This is equivalent to providing the learner with a set 
of alignable differences between instances and non-instances (Markman & Gentner, 
1997). But suppose that the mind of the learner does not possess any discrimination 
mechanism; that is, there is no cognitive process in his or her head that takes a set of 
alignable differences as input and computes an improvement in the relevant concept 
representation. In that case, the instructional move fails. Similarly, if an instructor teaches 
by providing an analogy, and if it should turn out that people do not possess any 
cognitive mechanisms for constructing analogies, then that instructional tactic must fail. 
In short, the Information Specificity Principle implies that instruction can only be 
effective if it provides information that can serve as input to one or more learning 
mechanisms in the student's head. This implies, in turn, that the designer of instruction 
has to have some hypothesis about those learning mechanisms and the types of 
information they take as input.  
Learning mechanisms make implicit assumptions about how knowledge is 
represented. For example, a generalization mechanism might operate very differently if it 
is supposed to generalize propositions than if it is supposed to generalize production 
rules, and it might require different information as input to accomplish those two tasks. 
This is why the cognitive fidelity of the knowledge representation matters: It helps the 
system provide precisely the type of information that the learner is mentally equipped to 
learn from (according to some theory). This is the type of cognitive fidelity that matters 
for instruction and hence for ITS design. 
In our own work on intelligent tutoring systems, we focused on the fact that the 
natural mode of instruction in an ITS is to provide help when the student is making 
errors; there is less reason for the system to intervene when the learner is producing 
correct answers and solutions. The focus of the theoretical effort was therefore directed 
towards a model of how students might detect and correct their errors, and how a tutor 
might help them do so. 
The ability to catch one’s own errors is paradoxical. If a person does not have 
enough knowledge to recognize an action or discourse as erroneous, then how can he or 
she catch the error? But if the person does have enough knowledge to recognize it as 
erroneous, then why is that action or discourse issued in the first place? The ability to 
catch one’s errors forces a distinction between generative and evaluative knowledge 
(Norman, 1981; Ohlsson, 1996a). On the one hand, there must be a system (e.g., a set of 
strategic rules) for generating actions. General dispositions, heuristics, orienting attitudes 
and strategies acquired in past experience suffice to generate task relevant actions but 
they do not guarantee that those actions are correct (or else the task is not unfamiliar after 
all). The result is exploratory, tentative behavior (heuristic search; trial and error).When 
the relevant rule base is incomplete or incorrect, errors result. On the other hand, there 
must be a separate knowledge base for evaluating the (outcome of) an action and judging 
it as correct or incorrect, as the case might be. These two knowledge bases are 
independent in the sense that a piece of knowledge that appears in one does not 
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necessarily also appear in the other. The interaction between these two knowledge 
systems is what we subjectively experience as catching ourselves making an error. 
This hypothesis only applies in scenarios in which the learner has at least some 
declarative knowledge of what correct solutions looks like, even before he or she is able 
to reliably generate them. This is in accord with intuition as well as instructional practice. 
Consider the task of recovering from being lost in unfamiliar surroundings. If the 
surroundings are truly unfamiliar, then one cannot tell, after walking for a while, whether 
one is closer or further from one’s goal. Without ability to recognize the correct path, the 
walker cannot make an informed judgment about the path he or she is taking. Descriptive 
knowledge of what the desired solution looks like (there is a gas station on the corner) is 
crucial for catching oneself making errors and correcting wrong choices. 
When an action outcome is found to be inappropriate, useless or incorrect (in a 
sense that depends on the task domain), the obvious response on the part of the learner is 
to revise the generative knowledge so as to avoid repeating that same error in the future. 
Over time, the information in the evaluative knowledge is gradually incorporated into the 
generative knowledge and the capability of the latter to generate correct actions gradually 
increases. The central process in skill acquisition is the migration of structure from the 
evaluator to the generator. 
This hypothesis suggests that people possess a learning mechanism that can take 
information about a detected error, plus the current representation of the relevant skill, 
and compute a revision of that skill such that execution of that skill in future situations 
will not generate that same type of error again. In prior work, we have defined and 
implemented a specific machine learning algorithm, called constraint-based rule 
specialization, that can accomplish this (Ohlsson, 1993, 1996a; Ohlsson & Rees, 1991a, 
1991b). The constraint-based specialization mechanism takes a constraint violation (and 
the current rule set) as input, and extracts condition elements from that information, 
which are then added to the condition side of the offending rule. The algorithm picks the 
new condition elements in such a way that future applications of the offending rule will 
either refuse to fire when the constraint is running a risk of becoming violated, or fire 
only when the constraint is already satisfied. The technical details of the learning 
algorithm have been published elsewhere, and the reader is referred to Ohlsson (1993, 
1996a, in press-b) and Ohlsson & Rees, (1991a, 1991b). 
For present purposes, the interesting question is what this learning mechanism 
implies with respect to instruction. If the mechanism takes a constraint violation as input, 
what does that mean? A constraint violation is a mismatch between a constraint of the 
domain and a particular state of affairs. For example, if a child counts five objects as, 
"one, two, three, three, four – four is the answer" this is obviously an error. The 
constraint is that in correct counting, every number word is to be used only once; the 
specific situation is that the number word "three" was used twice. The constraint violation 
therefore contains the information that the double use of "three" violates the one-one 
mapping constraint. If the child knows the one-one-mapping constraint, as some 
developmental psychologists have argued (Gelman & Gallistel, 1978), then he or she 
might be able to detect his or her error and react to the violation by constraining the 
procedure for generating the number words in the appropriate way. 
The design of relevant instruction would conform to this pattern. An adult 
watching the child count might be tempted to say, for example, "you said 'three' two 
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times but you should only use each number just once." This type of message contains the 
two pieces: the constraint ("use each number just once") and the specific feature of the 
solution that violates that constraint ("you said 'three' two times"). In general, if the 
constraint-based specialization hypothesis is approximately true – that is, if people learn 
in some way that approximates or is computationally equivalent to this algorithm – then 
instruction that contains information about (a) the occurrence of an error, (b) the 
constraint that is violated, and (c) exactly how the current state of the problem violates 
that constraint ought to  be effective. In short, the constraint representation exhibits 
cognitive fidelity in the sense that it provides the type of information that people can 
learn from (according to our learning theory).  
The fidelity of the constraint representation can also be evaluated empirically, by 
observing students using constraint-based tutors. Several constraint-based tutors have 
been developed since 1996 at the Intelligent Computer Tutoring Group (ICTG1). These 
tutors have been evaluated in more than 30 studies in authentic classroom situations, with 
students enrolled in relevant courses. SQL-Tutor (Mitrovic, 1998; Mitrovic, 2003) was 
the first constraint-based system to be formally evaluated, with the results demonstrating 
that students using it achieved significant learning gains. After only two hours with SQL-
Tutor, students outperformed their peers in the final examination, scoring an average of 
three quarters of a standard deviation higher on questions related to SQL query 
formulation (Mitrovic & Ohlsson, 1999). KERMIT, a database design tutor, has also been 
proven to be effective (Suraweera & Mitrovic, 2004). Students using this tutor during a 
regular laboratory session achieved significantly higher gains in their pre- to post-test 
scores (t = 3.07, p < 0.01) compared to their peers who received no feedback on their 
solutions apart for the ideal solution provided by the teacher. The effect size and power of 
this study were 0.63 and 0.75 respectively, at significance 0.05. 
A second approach to empirical validation of cognitive fidelity of a knowledge 
representation is to investigate the shape of the resulting learning curves. Anderson 
(1993, especially pp. 32-35 and Chapters 7 and 8) have proposed that psychologically 
valid knowledge representations are indicated by smooth learning curves. When the unit 
of knowledge employed in the analysis of data corresponds to the unit of knowledge in 
the learner's head, empirical measures of student learning exhibit regular and smooth 
learning curves. The empirical data reported in (Mitrovic & Ohlsson, 1999; Mayo, 2001; 
Mayo & Mitrovic, 2001; Suraweera, 2001; Martin, 2002; Martin & Mitrovic, 2002; 
Mitrovic et al., 2002; Suraweera & Mitrovic, 2004; Mitrovic, 2005; Weerasinghe, 2005; 
Zakharov et al., 2005; Baghaei & Mitrovic, 2006; Baghaei et al., 2006) show that the 
constraint-based representation is doing well on this criterion. Figure 2 shows the 
learning curves for three constraint-based tutors. In these learning curves, we plotted 
student performance in terms of the average probability of violating a constraint as a 
function of the number of times the constraint has been applied. As the figure shows, 
when learning is measured in terms of probability of violating a particular constraint, the 
learning process is highly regular. The number of opportunities to violate a constraint, 
and hence to acquire the knowledge encoded in that constraint, is a strong determinant of 
the probability of further violations of that constraint. 
 
                                                
1 http://www.cosc.canterbury.ac.nz/tanja.mitrovic/ictg.html 
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Figure 2 in here 
 
 
 
To further assess the cognitive fidelity of the constraint representation and its 
effects, we compared two versions of the database design tutor. In the first version, the 
tutoring messages were written on the basis of no other discipline than common sense. 
This often results in messages of the general form, you did X here but you should have 
done Y, a type of input for which learners might not have any learning mechanism, in 
which case instruction of this sort should have only weak effects. The second version of 
the tutoring system was identical, except that the tutoring messages were re-worded to 
conform closely to the implications of the constraint representation. That is, each 
message was worded to state the violated constraint in normal English, and to make clear 
exactly how the student's action violated that constraint. The results indicates that micro-
engineering the content of the tutoring messages in this way provided an additional 
pedagogical benefit over and above that provided by the common sense based tutoring 
messages. The students who received theory-based feedback had a higher learning rate 
than their peers who received common-sense feedback, as can be seen in Figure 3. 
 
 
Figure 3 in here 
 
 
To summarize, the constraint-based approach to ITS design exhibits cognitive 
fidelity in both the theoretical and the empirical sense. The instruction it delivers is 
designed to serve as input into the learning mechanisms that is hypothesized in the 
constraint-based, rule specialization theory of learning from errors (Ohlsson, 1996a). The 
effectiveness of the instruction across multiple instructional topics, the extra pedagogical 
benefit of making tutoring messages closely conform to the implications of the theory 
and the resulting smooth learning curves all provide empirical support for the cognitive 
fidelity of the constraint representation. 
 
The Efficiency of Constraint-Based Systems 
 
Intelligent tutoring systems are complex artifacts, and their design and implementation 
requires efforts comparable to those of other artifacts such as a cell phones and airplanes. 
Large-scale and wide-spread deployment of tutoring technology presupposes production 
methods that are efficient in at least two senses: First, there are severe limits on how 
much resources in terms of time and manpower the design and implementation of an ITS 
for a given subject matter topic can consume. Second, the execution of the resulting 
software system should be robust and fast. These dimensions are additional criteria for 
the evaluation of different tutoring technologies in general and specifically the 
knowledge representations on which they are based. 
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Implementation efficiency. The key step in building a constraint-based system is 
to write the constraint base - that is, to capture what is true of the subject matter domain 
in a set of constraints. This is a knowledge acquisition task, as the latter term is used in 
the study of expert systems. As in other ITS technologies, it is necessary to consult 
someone who understands the target domain well, and his or her knowledge has to be 
made explicit and cast in the form of constraints. The more complete the constraint base, 
the better. 
It is important that the constraints capture the principled aspects of the domain, 
and not merely surface features of particular training problems. For example, in an ITS 
designed to teach the task of deriving structural formulas from sum formulas in 
elementary chemistry, the constraints should capture the basic principles of the co-valent 
bond: Atoms strive towards the noble gas configuration, in which they have a full 
complement of electrons in their outer shell, and each co-valent bond requires two shared 
electrons. Sometimes particular facts have to be captured in constraints as well, e.g., that 
carbon atoms have four electrons in their outer shell. Constraints that capture the facts 
and principles of the domain constitute the core of the constraint base. Depending on the 
domain, it might be useful to also add constraints that refer to surface features of 
particular problems and their solutions, but this is not the main source of power of the 
constraint-based approach. 
Three features of the constraint-based knowledge representation contribute to the 
efficiency of implementation. First, there is no need for a separate bug library, i.e., a 
representation of students' errors. The constraint base, although a representation of what 
is correct and true about the domain, also contains the relevant bug library. A bug – a 
mistake – will, by definition, violate one or more constraints of the domain. Hence, the 
set of possible errors that the students can make is specified once the constraint base is 
determined: The bug library is the set of all possible constraint violations. Specifying the 
constraint base is therefore also to implicitly specify the possible errors. For example, the 
chemistry constraint, a covalent bond requires two electrons implicitly specifies the two 
types of errors a student can make in specifying a single covalent bond: He or she can 
assign a single electron, and he or she can assign three or more electrons. Either action 
violates the constraint that each bond requires exactly two electrons. 
This feature of the constraint-based approach means that the implementation of an 
ITS does not require empirical studies to identify the common student errors. This is a 
great advantage from a system building point of view. Such studies must collect large 
amounts of qualitative data and these have to be subject to painstaking analyses to 
identify and interpret errors. For example, the empirical data base for the original 
BUGGY/DEBUGGY system, including a large scale study of Nicaraguan school children 
and the so-called Southbay Study carried out in California, consisted of subtraction 
worksheets from more than two thousand students, gathered over a period of a couple of 
years (Brown & Burton, 1978; VanLehn, 1982). "…it requires a great deal of effort to 
build a database of bugs the size of the one the [sic] DEBUGGY now has. Lumping 
together the work of the six diagnosticians that have worked on the project over the last 
several years, we estimate that four or five thousand hours were spent" constructing the 
bug library (VanLehn, 1982, p. 38, italics in original). 
The cost and effort of constructing a bug library would be worthwhile, if the task 
could be done once and for all. However, what little data are available on the issue 
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indicates that the repertoire of errors among students might depend on the way a subject 
matter is taught and hence do not transfer easily between classrooms or educational 
systems. There is some evidence that bug libraries do not transfer well between different 
populations of students (Payne & Squibb, 1990). This opens up the nightmare possibility 
that a new ITS has to be re-implemented, not only for every subject matter topic, but for 
every approach to teaching a subject matter and perhaps for every student population as 
well, threatening to make ITS development a non-cumulative and unsustainable 
enterprise. Systems built with the constraint-based approach, in contrast, require little 
revision when moved to a different instructional context, because the constraint base only 
encodes what is correct about the domain, an aspect of the subject matter that does not 
vary across instructional situations and contexts. 
Computational efficiency. The process of executing a constraint base does not 
build chains of inferences, goal hierarchies, sequences of operators or other types of 
larger combinatorial structures. This is a great advantage, because the construction of 
larger structures is inevitably subject to combinatorial explosion, with the associated need 
for the system implementer to find some technique for pruning that explosion. In 
contrast, constraints are applied all at once, in parallel, and each constraint provides a 
signal (relevant? satisfied? violated?) that is independent of other constraints. 
The modularity of the constraint base also facilitates debugging. A large 
proportion of the time and effort that goes into debugging a knowledge base is caused by 
unanticipated interactions among knowledge elements (inference rules, production rules, 
etc.), but in the constraint based approach there are no such interactions. 
Because constraints are applied in parallel, execution of an ITS, once 
implemented, is fast and robust. In the standard implementation, constraints are 
implemented as patterns and applied via pattern matching. The latter is a well-studied 
problem, and several fast pattern matching algorithms exist, some of which exhibit a 
slower than linear growth with the number of patterns (Forgy, 1982).The fact that 
relevance patterns can be matched before satisfaction patterns and the matching of 
satisfaction patterns is only needed for relevant constraints also saves computational 
effort. 
 
Summary 
 
To summarize, the constraint-based approach to ITS design and implementation exhibits 
cognitive fidelity in the sense that it provides information that can serve as input into a 
well-specified learning mechanism and that mechanism is a plausible hypothesis about 
how human learn. Specifically, the constraint-based approach provides a basis for 
tutoring with the main pedagogical tactic that has been used in ITSs to date, namely to 
give feedback in response to errors. The learning gains produced by constraint-based 
systems, the slight but positive evidence that micro-engineering the feedback messages 
provides an additional increment of pedagogical power and the smooth learning curves 
that result when learning is plotted in terms of constraints provide empirical support for 
cognitive fidelity of the representation. Furthermore, the constraint-based approach is 
efficient in that (a) it requires no empirical studies of student errors and no explicit bug 
library, (b) the modularity of the constraint-base facilitates implementation and 
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debugging, and (c) the execution of a constraint-base requires no combinatorial processes 
and hence tends to be reliable and fast. 
 
FIDELITY AND EFFICIENCY OF MODEL-TRACING 
 
The knowledge representations that are commonly used in intelligent tutoring systems 
include production rules (Anderson, 1993; Anderson, Conrad & Corbett, 1993) and 
Bayesian networks (Mayo & Mitrovic, 2001; Mislevy & Gitomer, 1996; Conati, Gertner, 
& VanLehn, 2002). We compare the constraint-based representation to the first of these 
with respect to fidelity and efficiency, but space only allows a brief comment about the 
second. 
Production rules are a format for representing cognitive skills. Since the 
pioneering work on problem solving skills by Newell and Simon (1972), production rules 
have become perhaps the most commonly adopted hypothesis regarding the mental 
representation of cognitive skills. It is a central component of many cognitive models 
(Ohlsson, in press-a). Analyses by Anderson (see Anderson, 1993, especially pp. 32-35 
and Chapters 7 and 8), by Delaney, Reder, Staszeswki and Ritter (1998) and others have 
provided strong evidence that the production rule corresponds to a psychological unit of 
procedural knowledge. Semantic networks, propositional representations and schema 
representations also have impressive support in psychological research, but they represent 
declarative rather than practical or strategic knowledge and thus are not strictly speaking 
alternatives to production rules. 
In a previous section, we argued that the type of cognitive fidelity that is of 
central importance for tutoring is that it specifies the type of information that can serve as 
input to one or more learning mechanisms that constitute plausible hypotheses about how 
people learn. To evaluate the cognitive fidelity of a tutoring technology, we must 
therefore ask on which hypotheses about learning it is based. There are many learning 
mechanisms associated with production rule models (Ohlsson, in press-a), but we will 
focus on those proposed in the context of the ACT model of the human cognitive 
architecture. The research group behind this model initiated an approach to the design 
and implementation of intelligent tutoring systems generally known as model–tracing 
(Anderson et al., 1990, 1995). They also claimed that such tutoring systems exhibit high 
cognitive fidelity because they are based on the ACT theory (Anderson et al, 1990). 
Cognitive fidelity of model tracing tutors. Which learning mechanisms are 
hypothesized in the ACT model? This turns out to depend on the vintage. The ACT* 
model of the 1983 book, The Architecture of Cognition, sported five learning 
mechanisms: strengthening/weakening (of rules), generalization, discrimination, rule 
composition and proceduralization, the last two often being discussed in combination 
under the label knowledge compilation (Anderson, 1983). Of these, proceduralization can 
be conceptualized as a mechanism for turning task instructions into an initial set of 
(possible incomplete or erroneous) production rules, to be fine tuned by the other 
mechanisms. 
The proceduralization mechanism implies that students can benefit from task 
instructions, and strengthening/weakening implies that students can benefit from both 
positive and negative feedback (that's right and nope, that's wrong), rather unproblematic  
claims. In the 1983 formulation of the ACT theory, the generalization and discrimination 
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mechanisms both depended on having a set of examples or instances available in memory 
– all positive ones in the case of generalization, and both positive and negative in the case 
of discrimination – and the instructional implications were complicated: The tutor would 
have to contrive to present the learner with practice problems such that there is a high 
probability that the learner generates the requisite set of instances to run either 
mechanism. Similarly, to feed the right type of information into the rule composition 
mechanism, the tutor would have to contrive a drill sequence that guarantees that the 
learner repeatedly executes certain rules in a fixed sequence. ("…leaving students to 
induce generalizations and discriminations from carefully juxtaposed examples…would 
have been the pedagogical implication of ACT*"; Anderson et al, 1990, p. 18). These 
implications pose serious difficulties in implementation: how would a tutoring system 
select practice problems to achieve the right inputs to the generalization, discrimination 
and composition mechanisms? 
This question was never resolved, because the model-tracing tutors that were built 
in the period after the publication of the ACT* theory were not, in fact, designed in 
accordance with these instructional implications. These tutoring systems employed the 
standard instructional tactic of the ITS field: Wait until the student makes an error, and 
provide more or less extensive feedback in the form of an explanation. This instructional 
tactic does not follow from any of the five learning mechanisms of the ACT* theory. 
Neither strengthening, generalization, discrimination nor composition can take a current 
rule plus an explanation of an error as input and revise the rule accordingly. Weakening is 
a response to an error signal, but it does not take an explanation as input, merely the fact 
of a negative outcome, and its only effect is to lower the strength of a rule. So there is no 
role within that mechanism for the information provided by such an explanation.  
Discrimination is also a response to an error (it requires at least one negative 
instance), but it changes the offending rule on the basis of a comparison with positive 
applications of the same rule, not on the basis of the information in an explanation. 
Proceduralization operates on verbal input, but that input consists of statements about the 
correct way to perform the task. (It is not very useful to turn errors into new production 
rules.) Also, proceduralization generates new rules, it does not revise old ones. In short, 
although the first generation of model-tracing tutoring systems were claimed to have high 
cognitive fidelity because they were "based on" the ACT* theory, there was in fact no 
connection between the learning mechanisms hypothesized in that theory and the mode of 
instruction that was implemented in those systems. 
The five-mechanism theory of the ACT theory as of 1983 was abandoned. No 
critical analysis has been published to explain why. We have to assume that the theory 
did not mesh with the empirical findings of the ACT research group. In the next 
installment, ACT was equipped with an analogical learning mechanism that created new 
production rules in analogy with already learned ones. According to this version of the 
theory, analogical construction is the only way in which new production rules can enter 
the cognitive system; there are no other learning mechanisms: "…the only way new 
procedural knowledge, in the form of production rules, enters the system is by the process 
of analogizing to some previous declarative knowledge" (Blessing & Anderson, 2002, p. 
607). 
What are the instructional implications of this assumption? It predicts, strictly 
speaking, that tutoring cannot work. That is, there is no mechanism in the learner's head 
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that can take a feedback message and a current skill as inputs and revise that skill 
according to the content of that message. The only way to instruct according to the 
analogy-based version of the ACT theory is to carefully sequence practice problems in 
such a way that when the learner comes to a problem for which he or she needs a 
particular production rule, a prior analogue to that rule is available in memory. We know 
of no model-tracing tutoring system that instructs solely through clever problem selection 
and without feedback messages. 
The rule analogy hypothesis, as originally stated, was also abandoned. Once 
again, the exact mismatches with data that drove this revision of the theory have not been 
published. Analogy was later re-conceptualized as involving two mechanisms, a basic 
ability to notice similarities between objects that is assumed to be part of the cognitive 
architecture and a strategy of constructing analogies in response to impasses or 
difficulties; the latter is assumed to be learned and hence can operate differently in 
different domains (Salvucci & Anderson, 2001). The instructional implication of this 
version is the same as for the preceding version: If analogy is the only learning 
mechanism, then people cannot learn from tutorial feedback and pedagogy is reduced to 
clever sequencing of practice problems. 
ACT* eventually morphed into ACT-R through the marriage between the 
symbolic architecture and an extensive apparatus for sub-symbolic, quantitative learning 
known as the rational analysis of memory and decision making. The version of the ACT-
R theory published in The atomic components of thought (Anderson & Lebiere, 1998), 
did not specify any mechanism for the construction of new rules. No learning 
mechanism, no implications for instruction or ITS design. 
The latest version of the ACT-R theory is once again equipped with a single rule 
learning mechanism, called rule compilation (Taatgen & Anderson, 2002; Taatgen & 
Lee, 2003). This mechanism is a descendant of the rule composition mechanism of 1983 
vintage. Like its predecessor, the new mechanism operates by combining two rules that 
repeatedly execute in temporal sequence into a single rule. In the course of the 
combination, it eliminates retrievals from declarative memory by specializing the rule: 
The retrieved facts are incorporated as condition elements into the rule, thus creating a 
single, task specific rule that does not need to retrieve elements from declarative long-
term memory in order to execute. Once again, claims are made by members of the ACT 
research group that this is the only symbolic learning mechanism. ("New production rules 
are learned through production compilation." Taatgen & Lee, 2003, p. 67). 
What are the instructional implications of this mechanism? Its input consists of 
two rules, their instantiations and the information that they fired in chronological 
sequence. The instructional implication is, once again, that an instructor can only 
facilitate the operation of this learning mechanism by choosing practice problems in such 
a way that they will cause the relevant rules to execute in the sequence required for 
production compilation to generate the rules of the target skill. Once again, there is no 
role for instruction in the sense of tutorial discourse, e.g. feedback messages and 
explanations. 
Model-tracing tutors share with the ACT theory the use of production rules as a 
representation for cognitive skills, but there is no other sense in which they are "based 
on" that theory. However, the production rule format is not unique to model-tracing 
tutors. Constraint-based tutors also assume that cognitive skills are encoded in production 
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rules; the purpose of the constraint-based rule specialization mechanism is to revise 
production rules. The evidence for the cognitive fidelity of the production rule format 
thus supports both tutoring technologies equally. 
In short, we find that the claim that model-tracing tutors are "based on" the ACT 
theory of the human cognitive architecture to be spurious. The type of cognitive fidelity 
that matters for ITS design – that the instruction delivered is the type of information that 
can serve as input to one or more of the learning mechanisms in the learner's head, as 
specified in some plausible theory – is entirely absent from this line of tutoring systems. 
No version of the ACT theory ever contained a learning mechanism that can learn from 
feedback in response to an error, i.e., from the primary form of instruction delivered by 
the model-tracing tutors that have been published to date. Those tutoring systems lack 
cognitive fidelity in the sense that matters. 
Efficiency of model-tracing. Model-tracing tutors operate, in principle2, by 
matching production rules to students' problem solving steps. The rule base contains both 
correct and buggy rules. If a student step matches a correct rule, there might not be any 
reason to intervene. If the step matches a buggy rule, the match can be passed to an 
instructional decision maker that decides what instruction, if any, to deliver. In practice, 
the simplest pedagogy is to associate instruction in the form of canned messages directly 
with the corresponding buggy rules. 
(a) Efficiency of implementing an expert model. To implement a model-tracing 
system requires an explicit encoding of the correct or desired target skill, a so-called 
expert or ideal student model. Without such a model, the model-tracing system cannot 
know whether a student step that does not match any buggy rule is correct or marred by a 
bug not represented by any buggy rule. Constraint-based tutors also require an encoding 
of the correct subject matter. In the former case, this model is a rule base, in the latter, a 
constraint-base. One aspect of efficiency is thus whether it is easier or more difficult to 
construct one type of knowledge base than the other. 
One way to answer this question is to compare the implementation time per unit 
of knowledge. Anderson et al. (1995) estimate the time necessary for acquiring a single 
production rule to be 10 hours on average, while the reported time per constraint 
(Mitrovic & Ohlsson, 1999) is considerably shorter (1.1 hours). Comparative studies of 
efficiency are rare. Mitrovic, Koedinger and Martin (2003) reported a limited comparison 
in which a small portion of KERMIT, a constraint-based tutor for database design, was 
re-implemented using the model-tracing approach. The model-tracing version required 25 
production rules plus additional problem-specific information, represented in form of 
chunks, but covered only a small number of problems. On the other hand, the equivalent 
part of the constraint-based version of KERMIT included 23 constraints, required no 
extra problem-specific information other than the ideal solution for each problem, and 
was problem independent, enabling any number of problems to be taught. Kodaganallur, 
Weitz and Rosenthal (2005) built one model-tracing and one constraint-based tutoring 
system for one and the same task domain, a simple form of statistical hypothesis testing. 
                                                
2 We recognize that model-tracing is not a static concept and that there might be different 
ways to implement this technique. For brevity, we focus on the canonical version, as it is 
described in publications of the model-tracing systems, e. g., Anderson et. al (1990, 
1995). 
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They reported that the rule base, containing 76 rules, required over four person-months, 
i.e., approximately 120 person days, and that the constraint-base, comprising 43 
constraints, required 23 person-days (an average of two hours per constraint). What little 
quantitative data are available thus suggest that an expert model in the form of a 
constraint base requires considerable less work than the corresponding rule-based expert 
model. 
(b) Efficiency of implementing a buggy model. To implement a model-tracing 
tutor requires a buggy model, i.e., a rule base that encodes the common errors that 
students make on the path to mastery. The buggy rules can only be found through 
empirical studies. Such studies require the collection of large amounts of qualitative data 
which have to undergo painstaking analysis. The errors have to be understood in enough 
depth so that they can be encoded in terms of production rules. 
In contrast, constraint-based tutoring systems do not need a separate buggy 
model. The set of constraints implicitly defines the set of buggy solutions. In a constraint-
based system, a bug is a step, or sequence of steps, that violates one or more constraints. 
The universe of bugs is thus the set of all possible ways to violate the constraints. The 
specification of this universe requires no additional effort, over and above implementing 
the expert module. The universe of errors is given when the constraint-base is complete, 
or as complete as it is practical to make it in any given system. 
The savings in efficiency of implementation caused by this difference is difficult 
to overestimate. The empirical studies that underpinned the buggy models of the first 
generation tutoring systems were extremely time consuming and labor intensive; they 
sometimes took several man-years. Furthermore, they place the developer of intelligent 
tutoring systems in the uncomfortable position of having to pose as a cognitive 
psychologist and conduct empirical studies and analyze empirical data. Not all research 
groups that aim to develop ITSs possess the expertise or the inclination for this type of 
work. The constraint-based approach does away with the need for such studies. In short, 
when it comes to efficiency of implementation, the constraint-based approach is vastly 
superior to the model-tracing approach. 
(c) Efficiency of execution. Both constraint-based and rule-based tutoring systems 
need to contain a pattern matcher and operates primarily via pattern matching. This is 
advantageous because pattern matching is computationally cheap. In their basic forms, 
the two approaches are equal on this variable. 
However, the model-tracing approach potentially suffers from the following 
problem: Consider a solution path in which the (overt) action Ai is followed by some 
other (overt) action Aj. In the straightforward case, these actions can be traced by 
matching them to the production rules 
 
  R': Goal, C1, C2, C3,…, Ck ===> Ai, 
 
 and 
 
 R'': Goal, D1, D2, D3,…,Dn ===> Aj 
 
where C1, C2, C3,…, Ck and D1, D2, D3,…,Dn are condition elements (situation 
features). 
Ohlsson & Mitrovic, Fidelity and efficiency 
Printed  5/30/07   3:34 PM 
21 
A problem arises if the student has to engage in extensive thinking between Ai 
and Aj. That is, if his mental solution path is denser than the overt solution path, so that 
the better model of the student's path is: 
 
Ai, op1, op2, op3, …, opn, Aj. 
 
where op1, op2, op3, …, opn, are cognitive, internal operations, inferences, subgoaling 
steps, and so on. 
The problem resides in the fact that these internal operations change the content 
of working memory and hence affect the match of rule R''. Unless the working memory 
content is updated with the changes caused by the internal, intermediate operations, R" 
might fail to match, but for the wrong reason, and the overt step Aj might be interpreted 
as incorrect even though it is correct (if R" is a correct rule) or vice versa (if R" is a 
buggy rule). In order to decide whether Aj was the correct step (i.e.., whether it matches 
any correct production rule), the tutoring system has to know the state of working 
memory at the moment when the decision to execute Aj is taken - that is, the state of 
working memory at the end of the sequence of internal operations op1, op2, op3, …, opn. 
The implication is that the tutoring system must contain rules that control these 
operations as well.  
But how is the system to trace the operations op1, op2, op3, …, opn? By definition, 
they are not overt and hence leave no trace in the interface. The system could try to 
search forward from the last overt action Ai and see whether it can find a path to Aj, using 
only the correct rules. If so, it is reasonable to assume that Aj is a correct step. However, 
the model-tracing tutor now has to search. In the words of the inventors of model-tracing: 
"Often it is not clear which of a number of solution paths a student is on and the 
production system has to be used nondeterministically to enable a number of paths to be 
traced until disambiguating information is encountered." (Anderson et al., 1990, p. 35). 
Search is always combinatorial and hence potentially explosive in terms of the number of 
possible paths. A constraint-based tutor does not suffer from this problem, because it 
does not need to trace each individual action. 
We note that this problem can be finessed by designing the interface in such way 
that the students' overt actions are very fine grained and hence any sequence of internal 
cognitive operations between successive overt actions is likely to be short. This appears 
to have been the case with the Lisp Tutor (Anderson, Conrad & Corbett, 1989). This 
tutoring system apparently traced each individual key stroke during coding. Whether it is 
pedagogically desirable to give feedback at this fine granularity is an open question. 
In short, in the basic mode, constraint-based and rule-based tutors are comparable 
with respect to efficiency of execution. Both can operate their basic functions with a 
pattern matcher. To the extent that a model-tracing tutor needs to interpolate cognitive 
steps between overt, observable steps, it runs the risk of combinatorial explosion.  There 
is no corresponding problem in the constraint-based approach. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
There are two broad classes of dimensions that affect the usefulness of a knowledge 
representation for the purpose of intelligent tutoring. The first are aspects of cognitive 
fidelity, how closely the knowledge representation and its associated processes 
correspond to the knowledge representations and processes in the head of the learner. 
Within this broad concept, we can distinguish between two dimensions of fidelity. The 
first dimension is the cognitive fidelity of the representation itself, i.e., the extent to 
which a unit of knowledge in the representation corresponds to the units of knowledge in 
the student's mind. Along this dimension, production rules, as a representation for 
procedural knowledge, have the edge over all others, given the repeated demonstrations 
that analyzing learning data rule by rule gives more regular results than analyses in terms 
of number of training problems. However, constraints and propositions, as 
representations of normative and declarative knowledge are also plausible and supported 
by empirical data. When we analyze learning data in terms of constraints, we encounter 
the same regular pattern as when data are analyzed in terms of rules. 
A second dimension of cognitive fidelity concerns the learning mechanism that is 
supposed to operate on the knowledge representation. We do not know what learning 
mechanisms the mind contains, but hypotheses about learning mechanisms can be 
evaluated on the basis of plausibility, generality, sufficiency, adequacy with respect to 
such data as might be available, and so on. To apply this criterion, there has to be a well-
specified learning mechanism with specific implications for instruction. We find that the 
succession of learning mechanisms proposed in the context of the ACT theory, the theory 
that is claimed to underpin model-tracing tutoring systems, shows no sign of converging 
over time and appears unrelated to the main pedagogical tactic employed in model-
tracing tutors (give feedback when the student makes an error). On this dimension, the 
constraint-based approach is superior. The constraint-based mechanism for learning from 
error that is described in Ohlsson (1996a) is psychologically plausible, demonstrably 
general (Ohlsson, 1993) and sufficient to learn ecologically valid skills (Ohlsson & Rees, 
1991a; Ohlsson, Ernst & Rees, 1991). It is directly tied to the constraint representation 
and generates specific implications about which type of instruction that ought to be 
effective. The empirical data support these implications. 
The second cluster of dimensions concerns efficiency. It matters how easy or 
difficult a particular representation and its associated design philosophy are to use, and 
how fast the finished tutor can execute. With respect to efficiency of implementation, the 
constraint-based approach is superior to model-tracing. The reason is that building a 
constraint-base does not require empirical studies to identify common student errors, 
bugs or misconceptions. The relevant universe of errors is specified indirectly, as the set 
of possible constraint violations, once the correct subject matter has been specified and 
cast as constraints. The auxiliary cause of the superior implementation efficiency of the 
constraint-based approach is the modularity of the constraint base. Constraints are applied 
in parallel and they do not require any combinatorial processes, so debugging a constraint 
base is comparatively easy. Constraints do not combine into larger structures, so there is 
no risk for combinatorial explosion. The importance of these advantages in the ease of 
implementation cannot be emphasized enough. 
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Designing a knowledge representation to support intelligent tutoring by machine 
is a complex enterprise that needs to be evaluated along multiple dimensions. We should 
not expect any one representation to be superior to all competitors in every respect. 
Instead, each representation has its own unique profile of advantages and disadvantages, 
and the choice of representation might depend on the interaction between the advantages 
profile and the demands of the particular application. Table 1 summarizes the relative 
advantages we found in the course of our analysis. 
 
 
Table 1 in here 
 
 
A particular knowledge representation cannot be expected to be superior to all 
others in every respect. More reasonable expectations are that every knowledge 
representation will exhibit a profile of advantages and disadvantages for ITS work, and 
that any pair of representations will turn out to be close on some dimensions and differ 
along others. For example, if we compared either model tracing or constraint-based 
modeling to the Bayesian network representation, we would expect to find a different 
pattern of similarities and differences, advantages and disadvantages, compared to those 
in Table 1. For example, unlike production rules and constraints, the cognitive fidelity of 
Bayes Rule is questionable because people are not fully rational when reasoning with 
probabilities and often make smaller changes than Bayes Rule dictate. Implementation 
efficiency is also an issue, because to use Bayesian reasoning in a serious way, the 
system implementer has to have some prior conditional probabilities to hang on the links 
in the network, and securing those requires work. On the other hand, Bayesian networks 
win hands down over symbolic representations on the computational efficiency 
dimension, because number crunching is fast and reliable and the quantitative nature of 
the information provides for graded responses, graceful degradation and soft landings, all 
desirable properties in an ITS. A particular profile of strengths and weaknesses will 
interact with purpose and intended use of a system, resources available for building it, 
and other factors. The field might benefit from the emergence of a set of standard 
dimensions on which to evaluate current and future knowledge representations for ITS. 
Future work in the ITS field is likely to advance along a dimension not mentioned 
here: To what extent does the tutoring system support the full range of ways in which 
people learn? It is highly unlikely that human beings learn from a single learning 
mechanism. Instead, it is plausible that the mind has evolved a repertoire of learning 
mechanisms that are optimized to make use of the different sources of information 
available in the environment. The latter include negative feedback, but also positive 
feedback, task instructions, regularities in the execution trace such as temporal 
successions, impasses, search results, contrasts between negative and positive cases, and 
much more (Ohlsson, in press-a). According to the Information Specificity Principle, 
each learning mechanism provides an opportunity to support learning by providing 
information that can serve as input into that learning mechanism. Presumably, a tutoring 
system that feeds the relevant types of information into a wider range of mechanisms will 
provide more support for learning than systems that specialize in supporting a particular 
mechanism. 
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To date, the main instructional strategy of most ITSs has been to intervene when a 
student makes an error. The constraint-based approach was formulated with this 
particular form of instruction in mind. However, even a casual inspection of transcripts of 
interactions between human tutors and students reveal a multitude of types of tutoring 
moves, including an abundance of positive feedback. In future work, we intend to extend 
our systems to deliver other forms of instruction as well. It is an open question whether 
the constraint representation is sufficient to support those additional forms of instruction 
or whether additional knowledge representations will be needed. The future might belong 
to hybrid systems that encompass multiple knowledge representations that support a 
variety of tutoring tactics. 
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Table 1. Summary of Comparison Between Constraint-Based and Rule-Based Tutoring. 
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Table 1. Summary of Comparison Between Constraint-Based and Rule-Based Tutoring. 
 
     Constraint-  Rule- 
Dimension   Based   Based 
 
Fidelity 
 
    Knowledge       Well 
    representation  Supported  supported 
 
    Mechanism for 
    learning from  Strongly   Non- 
    negative feedback  supported   existent 
 
Efficiency 
 
    Implementation  Does not  Requires 
    efficiency   require a  a bug 
    bug library  library 
 
         Modularity  Rule 
         of constraints  interactions 
    facilitates  complicate 
    debugging  debugging 
    
   Computational  Modularity  Combinatorial 
   efficiency   avoids   explosion for 
    combinatorial  interpolated 
    explosion  steps 
 
    Fast execution  Fast execution 
    through pattern through pattern 
    matching  matching 
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Figure captions 
 
Figure 1. Schematic for learning mechanisms. 
 
Figure 2. Learning curves from evaluations of NORMIT, KERMIT and SQL-Tutor. 
 
Figure 3. Learning curves for students receiving theory-based versus intuitive feedback. 
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